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Abstract– Nowadays, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has become a promising network architecture in which network
devices are controlled in a separate Control Plane (i.e., SDN controller). In a specific aspect, employing SDN in a network
offers an attractive network security solution due to its flexibility in building and adding more new software security rules.
From another perspective, attack prediction and mitigation, especially for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,
are still challenges in SDN environments since a SDN control system works probably slower than a non-SDN one and the
SDN controller can become a target of attacks. In this article, at first, we analyze a real traffic use case in order to derive
DDoS indicators and thresholds. Secondly, we design an Openflow/SDN-based Attack Mitigation Architecture that is able
to quickly mitigate DDoS attacks on the fly. The design solves the existing problems of the Openflow protocol, reducing
the traffic volume traversing over the interface between the data plane (switch) and the control plane (SDN controller) and
decreasing the buffer size at the Openflow switch. Applying our proposed Fuzzy Logic-based DDoS Mitigation algorithm
that deploys multiple criteria for DDoS detection - FDDoM, the system demonstrates the ability to detect and filter 97% of
attack flows and reach a False Positive Rate of 5% that are acceptable figures in real system management. The results also
show that the network resource which is required to cope and maintain flow entries is 50% reduced during attack time.
Keywords– OpenFlow/SDN, DDoS attack, Fuzzy Logic.
1 Introduction
Network security has become an international critical
concern as we find more and more types of attacks
that harass networks. Within the security landscape,
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) has become the
most common and major threat to the Internet at pre-
sent. In this type of attacks, many hosts controlled by
attackers combine to send extremely huge volume of
seemingly legitimate network traffic to request services
from victims. Therefore, it consumes computer resour-
ces of the victims. This causes bandwidth be congested,
and the processing capability of network systems and
servers be exhausted. There are many proposed solu-
tions for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks. These
solutions are divided into two groups: signature based
techniques [1–3] and anomaly based techniques [4–7].
The solutions in the former group detect attacks by
comparing incoming traffic with stored attack samples;
hence they are inappropriate for detecting new DDoS
attack methods. The techniques in the latter group
require an exclusive device for collecting and analyzing
traffic data and applying statistical analysis or machine
learning methods. Some solutions are used just in the
offline mode to analyze in order to find out the original
attack source after the attack has occurred.
In another aspect, Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) [8] is a prominent future network model no-
wadays. In the SDN architecture, the control plane is
separated from the data plane that can provide network
operators with the ability to easily monitor, control,
manage and configure network resources and network
states through software executing in the controller.
OpenFlow/SDN [9] has come to the aforementioned
scene as a promising protocol used for communicating
between the control plane (controller) and the data
plane (OpenFlow switch). It allows the Controller to
send configuration messages to and receive messages
from OpenFlow switches. As a result, administrators
can centrally monitor, collect network traffics and de-
vice statuses in an easy way. Besides, in the SDN
architecture, OpenFlow switches can provide network
traffic statistical parameters, which are useful for se-
curity applications such as DDoS attack mitigation.
Another competitive advantage of SDN is that it can
provide an ability to process packets dynamically and
flexibly, differently from the configuration-fixed way in
conventional networks.
Within the SDN context, most of recent solutions
for DDoS detection and mitigation follow the method
of collecting and analyzing traffic characteristics from
flow entries existing in SDN switches, then creating
control policies. The disadvantage of these solutions
within the SDN system context is that the controller
must frequently query the information of flow entries
existing in switches, resulting in high bandwidth de-
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mand between the switch and the controller. Besides,
the capacity of the controller is actually reduced since
the controller must do the security job beside other
jobs (e.g., to analyze traffic, to make security policies).
The bandwidth interface between the controller and the
switch can easily get saturated when DDoS appears
in the network. Therefore, this bandwidth saturation is
an important issue for SDN system deployment since
attackers may make use of it to flood not application
servers but the controller instead.
In this article, we propose a novel SDN-based net-
work architecture with deployment of the FDDoM
(Fuzzy-based DDoS Mitigation) algorithm at a separate
device called Security Device (SD). The architecture has
capability of monitoring and analyzing statistical para-
meters of incoming flows on the fly. FDDoM provides
simple detection and fast mitigation since it does not
rely on learning from a huge database but only on given
thresholds. Our design architecture also outperforms
the current Openflow/SDN system by reducing traffic
volumes traversing through the interface between the
SDN controller and the Openflow switch (OFS), and
decreasing the demanded buffer size at OFS, by which
we can mitigate the aforementioned bandwidth satura-
tion problem.
The rest of the article is structured as follows.
Section 2 describes related works. Section 3 focuses on
analysis of traffic collected from NetNam, which is one
of the largest ISPs in Vietnam, to derive DDoS indica-
tors for the use case. In Section 4, we propose a multi-
criteria based SDN architecture for mitigating DDoS
attacks. The designed mitigation algorithm, FDDoM,
is elaborated in Section 5. The performance of such a
system is analyzed in Section 6. Finally, conclusion and
future work are given in Section 7.
2 Related Work
The common approach for DDoS-attack detection and
mitigation is collecting traffic characteristics before ap-
plying different algorithms in order to confirm whether
an attack is taking place or not. Each time the system
detects an attack, throughout the policies setting at
firewalls or prevention devices, the attack traffics are
identified and dropped [10]. Prevention plays a key
role in fighting against DDoS attacks. Currently, the
majority of the existing DDoS Prevention solutions,
such as entropy prevention presented in work [11]
and [12], source address distribution described in [13]
and [14], and activity profiling in [15], depends on
the characteristics of particular DDoS attacks. Conse-
quently, attackers can fool them in an easy way. For
instance, attackers may spoof source IP addresses by
using some common tools. But if distributed source
addresses created by attackers are the same as in reality,
the source address distribution method will not be
helpful for detecting DDoS attacks.
The works in [16, 17] present other solutions called
Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), which is a machine le-
arning technique for DDoS Prevention. In these works,
six statistical parameters of a flow collected from Open-
Flow switches are the inputs to the SOM training
process. However, SOM training requires hours to be
completed, and huge matrix computations and training
table for the machine learning technique.
Several other recent works dealt with the application-
layer DDoS attacks, such as [18–20]. The work in [18]
presents a solution for DDoS in the application layer
wherein the authors proposed a solution based on
Adaptive Selective Verification to defend an attack that
targets a particular application of a server. The work
in [19] copes with a set of algorithms to block attacks
while allowing legitimate user traffic, including flash
traffic which can only be differentiated by application-
layer methods. The authors in [20] also developed a
solution based on the machine learning based random-
tree method and traffic authentication in order to mi-
tigate undetected malicious traffic that mimicks legiti-
mate traffic.
Within the SDN context, there have been multiple
proposed DDoS detection and mitigation solutions.
Most of them rely on the process of collecting traffic
characteristics from flow entries existing in SDN swit-
ches in order to issue control policies such as drop
or forward packets by creating corresponding flow
entries [17, 21, 22]. A disadvantage of these soluti-
ons is that the controller must frequently query the
information of flow entries existing in the switches,
resulting in high bandwidth between the switches and
the controller. Besides, the process of analyzing traffic
and issuing security policies implemented at the con-
troller actually reduces the controller capacity. When
a DDoS attack appears, the controller capacity and the
bandwidth between the controller and the switches can
easily get saturated.
In [23], the authors proposed a solution called
AVANT-Guard which detects and mitigates TCP SYN
based on SYN Cookie right in the OF switch. With
this mechanism, only complete TCP connection is for-
warded to the controller and allowed to connect to
a server. A disadvantage of AVANT-Guard is that it
mitigates only the TCP SYN attack. Moreover, for each
TCP packet being migrated to the switch, they need
to process a step of translating the sequence and the
ACK number. Therefore, the switch has to maintain
states of each flow in order to do this translation step,
resulting in more resource consumption and reducing
performance of the OF switch.
The work in [24] proposed the solution called Li-
neSwitch which is an extension of AVANT-Guard in
which the OF switch maintains 2 lists of legitimate IP
addresses and recently suspected IP addresses. Once
there is a new connection, if the IP address exists in
the list of the legitimate IP addresses, the packet will
be forwarded immediately or controlled by the SYN
mechanism like AVANT-Guard with a given probability
p. If existing in the suspecting IP list, the packet will be
dropped and its IP address continues to be monitored
in the following duration T. A strong point of this
solution is that it can be applied for other types of
attacks other than TCP SYN Flood. But a weak point
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is that the system must maintain 2 lists, which increase
time for packet processing. When a DDoS attack takes
place, the 2 lists will quickly occupy the switch memory,
resulting in switch saturation.
Overall, common weak points of current SDN DDoS
detection and prevention methods are: (i) the process
takes place in either the switch or controller, resulting
in degradation of the whole system performance and
high latency, (ii) processed traffic is transmitted via
the encrypted interface between the OF switch and the
controller, leading to high bandwidth occupation at this
interface. This can be the Achilles’s heel for such an
SDN-based system since the interface can be saturated
by an attack if there is no approach to decrease the
traffic volume traversing over this interface.
Our proposed solution solves this issue by sending
data that are unmatched with existing flow entries
in OF switch to another network component called
Security Device (SD) instead of to the controller in case
the corresponding server is set in the suspected mode.
In addition, the fact that only a useful part of packet
headers is sent from the SD to the controller makes
the bandwidth demand over the SD–controller interface
remarkably reduced.
3 Case Study: Netnam’s Traffic Analysis
In our previous work [25], we presented the analysis
for traffic logged from Netnam – one of the main ISPs
in Vietnam. The traffic was captured in both Normal
and Under-DDoS-attacked states upstreaming to a web
server and stored as log files. After analyzing the traffic
characteristics from the log files, our findings in the
characteristics of the legitimate and anomaly traffic are
as follows:
• 70.38% of IATs (Inter Arrival Times) in the legiti-
mate state and 97.77% of IATs in the attack state
have values in the range of (0–0.2 ms],
• 9.88% of IATs in the legitimate state and 1.56% of
IATs in the attack state have values in the range of
(0.2–0.4 ms] and so on as shown in Figure 1.
• Flows containing only 1 packet occupy 13.18% in
the normal state while hitting the peak 88.76% in
the attack case.
• Flows consisting [2–10] packets account for 30.71%
in the normal case while 7.8% in the attack scenario
as described in Figure 2.
• The study also points out when a server is under a
DDoS attack, the number of incoming flows incre-
ases very much, up to 27.5 times higher compared
to the flows in case the server is in normal state.
Therefore, we can conclude the following:
• The rate IATs in the range of (0–0.2 ms] can be a
DDoS attack indicator since the figures of 0.977
and 0.7038 are significantly superior to other rates
of the same legitimate and attack state accordingly.
The figure below 0.7 may indicate a guarantee of
normal traffic while above 0.9 may indicate an
absolute attack. However, the range from 0.7 to 0.9
may present a certain degree of belonging to an
Figure 1. Histogram of packets grouped in the same IAT categories.
Figure 2. Histogram of flows having different packet quantity.
attack or non-attack state and depend on the other
attributes.
• The rate of 1-packet flows can be another indicator
for detecting DDoS attacks where the figure of
equal or more than 0.9 may indicate an absolute
attack and the figure of equal or smaller than 0.15
may indicate the normal traffic case. But the range
in between the two figures remains uncertain to
what degree the traffic belongs to the attack or
legitimate state.
At the bottom line of this analysis, the knowledge of
how legitimate and attack traffic looks like is a lodestar
to build thresholds to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks
with the FDDoM algorithm elaborated in Section 5.
The creation rate of new flows connecting to a server
may also be used as a signature of attack presence and
therefore we use this parameter as a prerequisite for
detecting a DDoS attack in Section 4.
4 Proposed System Architecture
4.1 The SDN based Network Security System
Architecture for DDoS Attack Mitigation
In this section, we propose an SDN/Openflow-based
network security system architecture that can detect
and mitigate DDoS attacks as demonstrated in Figure 3.
This architecture is designed to protect internet servers
at access networks in data centers or servers inside
small networks of enterprises/campuses which are con-
nected directly to the Internet via ISPs’ edge routers.
The architecture consists of an SDN Openflow switch
(OFS) connecting network servers to the Internet
through a core network or directly via a gateway.
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Figure 3. The proposed SDN based network security architecture.
Algorithm 1: Determining the state of server
IF (n f >= S2) THEN
Server_state = “Attack Mitigating”
ELSE
IF (n f >= S1 in consecutive N times) THEN
Server_state = “Suspected to Be Attacked”
ELSE
Server_state = “Normal”
ENDIF
ENDIF
The OFS is controlled and managed by an Openflow
Controller. In this architecture, a Security Device (SD)
is connected to the OFS via the data port so that the
SD can copy some ingress packets of coming flows for
security analysis.
4.1.1 Security Device: Security Device (SD) is the
main component of the SDN/Openflow security ar-
chitecture, responsible for analyzing, detecting attacks
and issuing packet processing policies to prevent or
reduce attack harm. In order to perform these functions,
SD includes a database storing traffic properties of the
current flows connecting to internal servers. Depending
on the security mechanism scheme, the system defi-
nes states of servers, rules to determine server states,
signatures to identify and policies to mitigate attack
traffic. With the scheme based on FDDoM (described in
Section 5), states of each internal server may be Normal,
Suspected to be Attacked (Under monitoring), or Attack
Mitigating. The system monitors and changes states of
the servers after each period T. For each server, SD
maintains counters for the number of current incoming
flows c f , the number of 1-packet flows op f , and the
number of flows recently created within the current
time period T - n f . Depending on the statistical cha-
racteristics of incoming normal traffic, administrators
can set three thresholds: S1, S2 and N for the server.
The values of c f and op f are used for calculating rate
of 1-packet flows, and the n f for determining server
states in next period based on the Algorithm 1.
4.1.2 Security Proxy: The Security Proxy (SP) is actu-
ally an application carried out in the Controller and
responsible for creating and modifying flow entries
at the OFS based on the packets-processing policies
defined by the SD. In a reverse way, the SP updates
information of flow characteristics in the database of
the SD whenever the controller receives an asynchro-
nous message from the OFS. For example, when the
controller receives event FLOW TIMEOUT from the
OFS, the SP analyzes the message and reduces, via
the SD, the number of current flows connecting to the
corresponding server.
4.2 Principles of DDoS Detection and Mitigation
The system monitors incoming packets from the
Internet to internal servers via flow entries installed
in flow tables in the OFS. Each TCP/UDP flow is
determined with five parameters corresponding to five
matched fields: source IP address, destination IP ad-
dress, protocol number, source port and destination
port. For ICMP flows, six parameters are used: source
IP, destination IP, protocol number, ICMP type, ICMP
code and ICMP number. Each flow entry is set with
timeout values (idle timeout and hard timeout) that can
be automatically removed from the flow table for saving
memory when its flow no longer exists.
4.2.1 In the “Normal” state: When a server is in the
Normal state, incoming packets from the Internet are
processed and forwarded as the way of the conventio-
nal SDN/Openflow mechanism. The incoming packets
are matched with existing current flow entries (CF_FEs)
in the OFS, then being processed and forwarded to
servers through corresponding matched flows (Steps 2
and 3 in Figure 4). If a packet can not be matched
with any CF_FE, it will be sent to the controller for
processing request. Consequently, the controller installs
a new corresponding CF_FE to the OFS for directing
the packet and following ones to the destination server
(Steps 4, 5, 6 and 9 in Figure 4).
During the progress, the SD counts for the current
flow number to each server c f , the new flow number
n f , and the number of flow which has only one packet
op f . Once the SP creates a new CF_FE, it also notifies
the SD to increase c f and n f . When the controller
receives a FLOW TIMEOUT message, the SP sends the
information to the SD to decrease the corresponding n f
counter (Steps 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13 in Figure 4). If the
timeout flow has only 1 packet, the SD also increases
the op f counter.
As mentioned above, after each period T, the SD
determines if the server should be set in the Under
Monitoring, or Attack Mitigating state by comparing the
numbers of new flows created within the recent period
n f with thresholds as described in Algorithm 1.
4.2.2 In the “Suspected to be Attacked” state: When a
server is switched to the state Suspected to Be Attacked
(Under Monitoring), the SD requires the SP to install
and modify related flow entries to forward or copy all
incoming packets to the SD for traffic analysis. In detail,
the SD requires the controller via the SP to:
1) Install a flow entry NF_FE (New flow): This flow
has the lowest priority in the flow table in the
OFS and is set with wild card for all matched
fields excepted for the destination IP address. The
action of the flow is to send matched packets
to the SD. When a packet incoming to a server
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Figure 4. Sequence diagram of the system in Normal state.
from the Internet reaches the OFS and it is not
matched with any existing CF_FE, the packet is
then matched to NF_FE and sent to the SD instead
of being forwarded to the controller.
2) Install a flow entry SB_FE (Send back from the
SD): After security analysis, if the SD decides to
send back the packet to the OFS, an SB_FE is
installed for matching and forwarding the packet
directly to an internal server or to other functiona-
lity flow tables in pipeline processing. To reduce
matching time with other CF_FEs, the priority le-
vel of SB_FE is set to be highest in the flow tables.
Differ from other CF_FEs, NF_FE and SB_FE are
not set with timeout values and therefore they can
exist until the server state is changed to Normal,
and the OFS receives the message to remove these
flow entries.
3) Modify related existing CF_FE flow entries
(Steps 17 and 20 in Figure 4) so that matched
packets are not only sent to the corresponding
server but also copied and sent to the SD (Step 4
in Figure 5).
With the packets received from the OFS, after each
period T, the SD analyzes the suspected traffic by
calculating the two parameters: rate of 1-packet flows
appearing in the period, and rate of IATs having values
smaller than a given threshold (Step 5 in Figure 5).
Taking these parameters as an input, the SD can issue
appropriate policies by using Fuzzy Logic-based DDoS
Attack Mitigation (FDDoM) algorithm deployed at the
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Figure 5. Sequence diagram of the Packet in event when a server in Suspected to be attacked state.
Figure 6. Sequence diagram of an event of Monitoring period ends when a server in Suspected to be attacked or Attack Mitigating state.
SD. FDDoM outputs decision Z (Step 2 in Figure 6)
according to the degree that a server could reach when
being under attack.
• If Z = 0 in consecutive N monitoring periods, the
system determines the server in Normal state. In
responding to the determination, the SD requires
the SP to delete NF_FE, SB_FE and to modify
CF_FEs in the OFS to stop copying packets being
sent to the SD (Steps 4, 6 and 7 in Figure 6).
• If Z > 0, the system determines server under a
DDoS attack and switches to the Attack Mitigating
state (Step 8 in Figure 6).
4.2.3 In “Attack Mitigating” state: When a server is
under the state Attack Mitigating, based on the Z va-
lue returned by FDDoM, the SD drops rate Z of the
flows going in the corresponding server. The dropping
process is implemented in sequence as follows:
1) First, drop 1-packet flows up to rate Z of all flows;
flows which are first created are dropped first.
2) Besides, newly created flows are checked if they
can be forwarded to the server (Step 8 in Figure 7).
3) If the number of current flows going in a server
excesses the server capacity, the corresponding
new flow entry is not created and the correspon-
ding packets are discarded.
4) If the number of current flows to a server is
under the acceptable level, the new flow entry
corresponding to the packet is created; and the
packet is forwarded to the server (Steps 9 to 13 in
Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Sequence diagram of the Packet in event when a server in Attacked Mitigating state.
5 Fuzzy logic-based DDOS Mitigation
Algorithm (FDDoM)
As stated at the beginning of this article, to detect
possible attacks, network administrators may have to
establish a very long look-up table, which is an entang-
led matrix of various detection and prevention rules.
This issue can be more problematic when the number
of inputs (rules) increases or values of inputs vary in a
continuous domain. In that situation, an administrator
may have to pay a lot of effort in determining mitigation
rules from all combinations of the inputs in the look up
table. From this intangibility perspective, fuzzy control
may be a right solution to fix that problem since fuzzy
control can make the detection implementation much
simpler [26, 27] by just adjusting thresholds other than
creating a look-up table of rules. In this article, we pro-
pose the Fuzzy Logic-based DDoS Mitigation (FDDoM)
algorithm to detect attacks and decide the policy of
dropping incoming traffic to mitigate the attack effects.
Based on multiple criteria (e.g., the tw criteria defined
in Section 3), FDDoM determines the degree at which
the traffic belongs to an attack. FDDoM is implemented
in the SD of the proposed SDN architecture.
FDDoM is built based on the well-known Sugeno
Fuzzy Inference System method [27] to form rules as
well as to de-fuzzy the outputs. Our contribution is that
we define the shape of memberships in the fuzzification
step (clause B) and the rules (clause C) that results in
our detection and mitigation scheme and performance.
5.1 Choose the Inputs as Detection Indicators
Based on the traffic analysis of Netnam in Section 3,
the two appropriate detection indicators can be:
• IAT: rate of packets having IATs in range (0–
0.2 ms],
• PpF: rate of flows having only one packet per flow.
The FDDoM mitigation rules can be linguistically
summarized as follows:
1) If traffic has the two indicators (IAT and PpF)
which fall below our predefined normal thres-
holds, then the traffic is defined as absolute nor-
mal traffic and will be 100% forwarded (or drop-
ping rate Z = 0).
2) When the two indicator values go beyond the
predefined attack thresholds, traffic is detected
as absolute attacks. Traffic within this monitoring
window will be dropped totally (Z = 1).
3) However, when both indicators or one of them
fall in the range between absolute normal and
absolute attack thresholds, then the traffic has a
certain degree of belonging to attack and another
degree of belonging to the normal traffic. The
system will then drop rate Z of the incoming flows
to reduce the risk of being attacked. The figure Z
(range from 0 to 1) will be calculated by FDDoM
in three main steps: Fuzzification, Rule Evaluation
and Defuzzification.
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Figure 8. Fuzzification of IAT.
Figure 9. Fuzzification of PpF.
5.2 Fuzzification of the Selected Inputs
The SD fuzzifies the two crisp inputs (IAT, PpF) into
two fuzzy numbers. In order to realize this step, we
have to define the fuzzy shapes which reflect fuzzy
memberships to which we map non-fuzzy input values
(IAT, PpF).
In this case, IAT and PpF can be qualified in lin-
guistic terms of Low and High. It means that based
on the two attributes, traffic can be classified in either
a low or high volume, or some state in between that
shows the degree of traffic belonging to the attack or
normal category. We define membership functions to
quantify a linguistic term of Low or High which are
the set of decomposition for the linguistic variables IAT
and PpF. And the two inputs IAT and PpF are fuzzified
as discribed in Figures 8 and 9.
As illustrated in these figures, fuzzification mem-
bership Low is presented in blue while High in red.
We define the two memberships in the trapezoidal
shapes since the shape can appropriately presents the
membership characteristics such as:
• When the IAT and PpF values are below 0.8 and
0.15 respectively, they are considered to absolutely
belong to the Low membership, therefore incoming
traffic shall be detected as legitimate traffic and
being 100% forwarded through the switch.
• When the IAT and PpF values are above 0.9, they
are considered as to absolutely belong to the High
membership and therefore traffic shall be detected
as malicious traffic and being 100% dropped.
• The cross-region of the Low and High membership
presents the ranges in which we are not sure if traf-
fic is normal or attack. In other words, traffic has a
certain degree of belonging to the Low membership
and has another degree of belonging to the High
membership, where the thresholds such as 0.8, 0.9
and 0.15 (the vertices of the trapezoids) shown
in Figures 8 and 9 are derived from the traffic
analysis of Netnam elaborated in Section 3. That
range is where the Fuzzy Logic comes into play
as it will decide a degree of the traffic belonging
to a membership and decide how many percent of
flows should be dropped (Rate Z).
Based on the defined fuzzification of the inputs (i.e.,
the two trapezoids), the degrees of the inputs belonging
to either the Low or the High membership are expressed
as follows:
FLow(IAT) = max[min(
IAT − a
b− a , 1,
d− IAT
d− c ), 0], (1)
FHigh(IAT) = max[min(
IAT − a′
b′ − a′ , 1,
d
′ − IAT
d′ − c′ ), 0], (2)
FLow(PpF) = max[min(
PpF− e
f − e , 1,
h− PpF
h− g ), 0], (3)
FHigh(PpF) = max[min(
PpF− e′
f ′ − e′ , 1,
h
′ − PpF
h′ − g′ ), 0], (4)
where a, b, c, d, e, f , g, h and a
′
, b
′
, c
′
, d
′
, e
′
, f
′
, g
′
, h
′
are the
vertices of the 2 trapezoids for 2 inputs; IAT and PpF
are any considered crisp input values in the X axis.
5.3 Rule Evaluation
In this stage, the control rules in the SP upon recei-
ving information of crisp inputs (IAT and PpF) from
the Security Device, referred to as “actions”:
• Action = Fw (i.e., Forwarding all flows).
• Action = Dr (i.e., Dropping rate of Z of flows).
Then the rules are formed as follows:
Rule 1: If IAT = Low AND PpF = Low, then Z = Fw.
Rule 2: If IAT = High AND PpF = High, then Z = Dr.
Rule 3: If IAT = High AND PpF = Low, then Z = Dr.
Rule 4: If IAT = Low AND PpF = High, then Z = Dr.
Each rule weighs its output level by the firing
strength of the rule, Wi, which are computed as follows:
W1 = min[FLow(IAT), FLow(PpF)], (5)
W2 = min[FLow(IAT), FHigh(PpF)], (6)
W3 = min[FHigh(IAT), FLow(PpF)], (7)
W4 = min[FHigh(IAT), FHigh(PpF)], (8)
where FLow and FHigh are the membership function of
input IAT and PpF.
Classes of the two output actions can be assigned as:
Dr = 1; Fw = 0. (9)
5.4 Defuzzification
Using the Sugeno FIS, the resulting output (action)
is a mathematical combination of the rule strengths
(degrees of applicability) and the outputs (actions). The
final crisp output of the system can be defined as the
weighted average of all rule outputs, computed as:
Z =
∑Ni=1 WiZi
∑Ni=1 Wi
=
W1.Fw +W2.Dr +W3.Dr +W4.Dr
W1 +W2 +W3 +W4
, (10)
where N is the number of rules (N = 4).
This step helps result in a crisp output Z that ranges
from 0.0 to 1.0. It tells the system to drop a rate of Z
of incoming flows based on each monitored specific set
of crisp inputs.
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6 Discussion and Performance Analysis
6.1 Discussion
With the architecture and principle operation descri-
bed in Section 4 and 5, our solution has the following
three advantages.
6.1.1 Reduction of traffic over the OFS-Controller in-
terface: According to the current SDN principle, un-
matched (table-missed) packets are forwarded to the
controller. But when an attack happens, the traffic
volume over this interface gets much higher, making
this interface saturated. Besides, since the traffic over
this interface is encrypted, the increased traffic volume
also consumes more resources of the OFS and controller
for encryption and decryption. Attackers may make use
of this weak point to attack the system by generating
a huge volume of packets belonging to different flows
that then creates plenty of Packet-in events in the sy-
stem. When our solution is applied, the whole traffic
is only transmitted over this interface when a server
is considered in the normal state. When a server is
switched to the state of Suspected to Be Attacked or Attack
Mitigating, the whole table-missed traffic is forwarded
to the SD. At the SD, a part of table-missed packets are
discarded (i.e., not being forwarded to the controller)
if the server is determined under attack. Consequently,
traffic destined to the server is reduced. In addition, the
SD does not send the whole header of a packet to the
controller, but send the useful part of the header, such
as source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, and destination port. This makes the encrypted
traffic traversing between the SD and the controller
significantly reduced in comparison with data in the
system without this solution.
6.1.2 Fast Response Capacity: In the other approaches
like [21, 22], the process of analyzing traffic and issuing
packet-processing policies is implemented at the con-
troller. After each monitoring duration T, the controller
must query flow tables to retrieve data parameters,
analyzing and detecting an attack. In responding to
detecting an attack, flow entries are created in the
OFS with the corresponding action: drop ingress pac-
kets. This mechanism not only increases traffic over
the OFS-Controller interface since the system needs to
query/create flow entries but also makes the system to
respond slow during the attack. With our proposed so-
lution, the policy of processing packets is implemented
right at the SD. When packets are forwarded to the SD,
if a server is determined to be under attack, the packets
can be discarded immediately without any policy of
processing the packets at the OFS. This approach also
overcomes another common issue: process 1-packet
flows. A common DDoS attack technique is IP spoofing
when an attacker generates a large number of 1-packet
flows to a victim server. After receiving the first and
also the only one packet of a flow, a corresponding
flow entry will be created in the OFS and last until the
idle timeout is over. If the controller continues creating
flow entries, these flow entries keep existing in the OFS
during another idle timeout without any processing
policy since no 2nd packet of the flow arrives. Our
Figure 10. Z values output of FuzzyLogic vs. Attack Filtering Rate.
solution overcomes this issue. When there is a sign of
only 1 packet, the SD requires the controller to discard
the corresponding flow entry in the switch (OFS).
6.1.3 Buffer reduction in OFS: With the existing con-
ventional SDN operation, once an arriving packet does
not match with existing flow entries in the OFS, a
part of the packet is forwarded to the controller while
its whole content is buffered in the OFS. In case the
resource of the OFS becomes exhausted, the whole
payload of the packet is forwarded to the controller.
During DDoS attacks, the number of table-missed pac-
kets dramatically increases, resulting in fast OFS buffer
exhaustion. From this perspective, our proposal has
advantage that it requires no buffer usage during the
Suspect to Be Attacked or Attack Mitigating state since
packets are forwarded directly to the SD.
6.2 False Positive Rate and Filtering Rate
Performance
In this subsection, we verify the performance of FD-
DoM by checking the False Positive Rate. False Positive
Rate is popularly defined as any normal or expected
behavior that is identified as anomalous or malicious.
The false positives evaluation is carried by computing
the rate of legitimate flows misdropped by FDDoM.
In order to realize the purpose, we apply the FDDoM
scheme in the system to analyze Netnam traffic dataset
for 10 minutes with monitoring period T of 30 seconds.
The traffic scenario is set up as follows: during the first
stage of 120 seconds (4 window samples), there was
only legitimate traffic. In the next stage from second
120th to 420th, we sent both normal and attack traffic to
the server. Beyond the second 420th up to second 600th,
we got only normal traffic back again.
During each monitored window, based on the traffic
statistical characteristics, FDDoM will calculate Z va-
lues to kill rate Z of incoming flows in order to reduce
the attack risk.
As Figures 10 and 11 illustrate, during the period of
having only normal traffic (i.e., from second 0th to 120th,
and from second 480th to 600th), FDDoM decides to
drop a rate of 0 of the incoming flows. However, during
the period of having both normal and attack (i.e., from
second 120th to 450th), FDDoM always return dropping
rates (Z values) approximately to 1. Figure 11 shows
that false positive killing appears only within the attack
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Figure 11. False Positive Rate performance.
Figure 12. Comparison of existing flow entries in OFS.
duration with the peak rate of below 0.05 outside the
attack duration, FDDoM can recognize normal traffic
exactly by returning Z value of 0 (i.e., the false positive
rate is equal to 0).
In conclusion, if we consider the performance in each
period:
• The Attack filtering Rate reach 92% to 95%;
• The False Positive Rate is limited by 5.1%.
If we consider the performance in the whole course:
• The Attack filtering Rate reaches 97%;
• The False Positive Rate is bounded by 4%.
To the best of our knowledge, those performance
figures can be accepted in a real system.
6.3 Reduction of attack flow entries in the OFS
Since most of attack flows have only one packet,
these flow entries occupy the memory of a server once
created in the OFS, leading to waste of the resource of
the OFS. Moreover, the processing of matching a packet
takes longer, resulting in lower efficiency of the switch.
When our solution is applied, the flow entries of attack
flows are removed, mitigating the attack impact. As
Figure 12 shows, the number of flows entries in the
OFS is reduced up to 50% during attack.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we have presented our design of an
Openflow/SDN system architecture that is capable of
dealing with DDoS attacks. The architecture owns both
the control flexibility of an SDN system and the effi-
ciency of mitigating DDoS malicious traffic. With our
designed FDDoM algorithm based on our findings on
the Netnam traffic characteristics, the mitigation perfor-
mance is proved to work efficiently with high filtering
rate while the false positive rate is kept reasonably low
(approximately 5%). This design can be used for other
use cases by finding other thresholds for other traffic
scenarios and adjusting the vertices of the trapezoids in
FDDoM accordingly to achieve the same performance
results. In future, we vision to extend the Openflow pro-
tocol more to achieve robuster and faster performance
of the OFS and the controller since the SDN system is
actually slower than a non-SDN system.
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